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A Market Analysis of Dairy Compacts Using
A Model of Discriminatory Pricing
by
Kenneth W. Bailey
The 1996 Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act contained a
provision to create a new price support program for a select group of dairy farmers.
Section 147 of the Act established the Northeast Interstate Dairy Compact (Northeast
Compact) consisting of Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode
Island and Vermont.  The legislation was specified in section 1(b), Senate Joint
Resolution 28 of the 104th Congress, and was subject to a number of conditions.
There is growing interest in expanding the Northeast Compact to include states
like New York and Pennsylvania, and creating multi-region dairy compacts from Ohio to
Florida and all the way west to Texas and Oklahoma.  Many states are losing dairy farms
and rural economic activity.  State and federal legislators in these states are looking to
dairy compacts as a regulatory measure to provide additional support to their local dairy
industry.
The objective of this paper is to evaluate the market impacts of forming regional
dairy compacts.  A national study will be conducted to evaluate the economic tradeoffs
between dairy farmers, fluid milk consumers, processors, and retailers both in and outside
of dairy compact regions.
Model
A discriminatory pricing model will be used to evaluate the market impacts of
regional dairy compacts under federal milk marketing orders.  Kessel developed an2
earlier model of discriminatory pricing under classified pricing for an individual federal
order.  Ippolito and Masson developed a market model for milk under classified pricing.
That model assumed regulators set classified prices not solely to maximize farm rents,
but also to develop an adequate milk supply to meet the needs of consumers.  The
limitation of the Ippolito and Masson model, however, is that it assumed the price of milk
for manufacturing purposes was set by federal regulators.  Thus a revised model of
discriminatory pricing will be developed to solve simultaneously for the price of
manufactured milk (see Bailey and Gamboa for more detail).
An intermediate-run regional economic simulation model of the U.S. dairy
industry was developed in this paper (see Table 1).  This model (Dairy Compact Model)
reflects the economics of federal and state orders, and includes a set of elasticities derived
from the literature.  The model will be “calibrated” to a baseline reflecting regional
supply, demand and prices.  A number of dairy compacts (i.e. Northern, Mid-Atlantic,
and Southeast) will be imposed on the model.  The model will then be simultaneously
resolved.  The difference between the baseline and the model simulations would
represent the economic impact of dairy compacts.
A baseline will be constructed to reflect Secretary Glickman’s proposed federal order
reform structure.  Secretary Glickman proposed a number of options for redefining Class
1 differentials.  The least controversial was Option 1A.  This option is most similar to
current Class 1 differentials and will be used in this analysis.  In addition, Secretary
Glickman’s proposal contained new definitions of class prices
The Dairy Compact model will be similar in structure to policy models developed by
Gardner.  Supply and demand equations will be specified using a constant elasticity3
functional form.  The model is a static equilibrium model that reflects intermediate-run
adjustments in the milk supply.  It is multi-regional;  thus it reflects supply, demand and
prices for milk and dairy products in each federal milk marketing order.
Assumptions Used in the Study
The results in this study are conditioned on the following critical assumptions:
1.  A fixed $2 per cwt compact premium used in all of the compact scenarios,
2.  Market over-order premiums remain unchanged in the compact scenarios,
3.  A fixed dollar mark up will be used in the farm-to-retail margin for fluid milk
prices.  That dollar margin will remain unchanged under model scenarios.
4.  Number of states defined in the Combined Dairy Compact scenario.
Instead of defining a compact price for each compact region, a fixed $2 per cwt compact
premium (price wedge) was assigned.  This premium is similar to the average effective
compact premium realized by the Northeast Compact during July-October,1997, a period
that can be described as normal marketing conditions (U.S. market prices escalated
sharply thereafter).  It was also assumed that existing market over-order premiums in
1997, which were used in the 1999 baseline, would be maintained under the Combined
Dairy Compact scenario.  Also, the compact results are dependent on the definition of the
farm-to-retail margin.  In this study, a fixed dollar (rather than a fixed percentage) farm to
retail markup was used.
Three regional compacts will be simulated:  Northern, Mid-Atlantic, and
Southeast.  Together they will form a combined dairy compact scenario.  This scenario
will then be compared to the baseline.  The boundaries for these compacts are in Table 2.4
Model Results
The model results in this study are similar to that of the Office of Management and
Budget study on dairy compacts(see Tables 3 and 4).  They show that within a dairy
compact region, dairy producers receive a higher effective farm price ($0.54-$1.13 per
cwt.) due to the compact premium.  Farmers expand milk production and hence milk
marketings 1.4 - 2.6 percent.  Consumers pay more for fluid milk since the compact
premium raises the cost of milk to processors ($0.15 per gallon).  Hence fluid milk
consumption and Class 1 use declines 1.6 - 1.8 percent.  Overall spending by consumers
on fluid milk in the compact region increases 3.4 - 4.0 percent.   Greater milk marketings
and less fluid milk consumption in the compact region results in more milk being used
for Class 3 and 4 purposes.  That results in increased production of butter, nonfat dry
milk and cheese in compact regions.  Those products are then sold on the national market
which results in lower national wholesale prices for butter, nonfat dry milk and cheese.
The increase in dairy product production in the compact region has an impact on
dairy producers and consumers outside the compact region.  Lower wholesale prices for
butter, nonfat dry milk and cheese result in lower class prices in all federal milk
marketing orders.  The new formulas for class prices under order reform are directly
linked to dairy commodity prices.  Lower dairy commodity prices result in a lower Class
1 price mover, and lower prices for Class 2, 3, and 4 milk.  Thus farmers in non-compact
regions and states receive a lower price for their milk ($0.16-$0.21 per cwt.).  They then
respond by producing less milk.  Consumers in non-compact regions and states, on the
other hand, face a slightly lower price for fluid milk and marginally increase their fluid
milk consumption.  Thus farm milk sales decline and fluid milk consumption increase
marginally in non-compact regions and states.5
Butter and nonfat dry milk production in the U.S. increased 0.4 percent and
cheese production increased 0.6 percent due to increased milk production and reduced
Class 1 use.  Declines in cheese, butter and nonfat dry milk prices due to increased
production resulted in lower component prices.  That resulted in lower skim milk and
butterfat prices for all class prices under federal orders and the California order.
The gains in milk marketings in the Northeast, Appalachian, Florida and
Southeast orders were not entirely offset by declining marketings elsewhere.  This
increase in U.S. milk marketings was due to a $0.076 per cwt increase in the weighted
effective U.S. average farm price.  Total U.S. Class 1 milk sales declined 343 million
pounds.  All of the declining Class 1 sales were in the compact orders and were due to the
$2 compact premium.
Economic Tradeoffs
The economic tradeoffs between dairy farmers, processors/retailers, and consumers by
region are presented in Table 4 below.  The results suggest that within a compact region,
earnings for dairy farmers increase at the expense of processors/retailers and consumers.
Processors/retailers face lower earnings due to reduced fluid milk consumption.
Consumers must pay more for fluid milk.
Outside the compact regions, dairy farmers face lower farm prices and earnings.
That’s due to lower class prices due to reduced prices for butter, nonfat dry milk, and
cheese.  Consumers in these regions, on the other hand, pay less for milk and dairy
products since lower class prices result in slightly lower retail prices.6
Conclusions
This analysis indicates that dairy compacts represent a new form of discriminatory
pricing that will result in economic tradeoffs between dairy producers, consumers,
processors and retailers.  The results of this study depend on: (1) the degree of price
enhancement resulting from the compact, (2) the number of states involved in compacts,
(3) how prices are marked up from farm to retail, and (4) whether or not existing market
over-order premiums change.
It was assumed that only 27 percent of the nations milk supply was involved in
one or more dairy compacts.  Given a $2 compact premium, farmers in compact regions
realized a net increase in farm-gate milk prices of $0.54-$1.13 per cwt.  However,
consumers in the compact paid more for fluid milk, at least $0.15 per gallon.  Also, dairy
farmers outside the compact region realized lower farm-gate milk prices of $0.16 to
$0.21 per cwt.  Thus clear economic tradeoffs are evident.
Congress has the authority to allow the Northeast Interstate Dairy Compact to be
maintained and/or expanded, and to create new regional dairy compacts.  Clearly this will
be a divisive issue since some farmers will gain an economic advantage over other
farmers, and processors and retailers in compact regions will sell less fluid milk. Thus
Congress should consider the economic tradeoffs presented in this study before deciding
on the future of dairy compacts.
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Table 1.  Dairy Compact Simulation Model
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Endogenous Variables
BPGE: butter/nonfat dry milk gross earnings, $/cwt. milk
CD I F
i 1 : class 1 differential, $/cwt., federal order i
CM O V E R 1 : class 1 mover, $/cwt.
CP
i 1 : class 1 price, $/cwt., federal order i
CP G
i 1 : class 1 cost of fluid milk to processors, $/gal., federal order i9
i U C1 : class 1 use, mil. lbs., federal order i
CP 2 : class 2 price, $/cwt.
i U C2 : class 2 use, mil. lbs., federal order i
CP 3 : class 3 price, $/cwt.
i U C3 : class 3 use, mil. lbs., federal order i
CP 4 : class 4 price, $/cwt.
CU
i 4 : class 4 use, mil. lbs., federal order i
CGE : cheese gross earnings, $/cwt milk
DU j: domestic use, mil. lbs., dairy commodity j
P bt : price of grade AA butter, Chicago, $/lb.
c P : price of 40-lb. block cheese, Chicago, $/lb.
P b
i : farm blend price, $/cwt., federal order i
n P : price of nonfat dry milk, Central States, $/lb.
PCF
i: per capita fluid milk consumption, lbs., federal order i
PRDj: production, mil. lbs., dairy commodity j
RFME
i : retail fluid milk expenditures, mil. dollars, federal order i
RPF
i: retail fluid milk price, $/gal., federal order i
i S : milk marketings, mil. lbs., federal order i
i TFC : total fluid milk consumption, mil. lbs., federal order i
Exogenous Variables
α : milk supply elasticity
β : retail fluid demand elasticity
θ : class 2 elasticity
ξ
i: the proportion of residual milk used for class 3 use, percent, federal order i
δ : class 3 elasticity
λ : proportion of class 3 milk used to make butter from whey cream
η j: demand elasticity, dairy commodity j
$MU
i : farm to retail markup, $/gal., federal order i
CP
i : compact premium, $/cwt., federal order i
MECj : milk equivalent conversion factor, dairy commodity j
bm P : price of dry buttermilk, Central States, $/lb.
w P : price of dry whey, Central States, $/lb.
POP
i : civilian residential population, mil., federal order i
PR
i: class 1 market over-order premium, $/cwt., federal order i
j : dairy commodity (c=cheese, bt=butter, n=nonfat dry milk)
AG − : model constants10
Table 2. Regional Boundaries for Dairy Compacts Used in the Model Simulation
Dairy Compacts Proposed Federal Orders
included in the Compacts
Unregulated Areas
included in the Compacts
Northern Dairy Compact Northeast Maine
Mid-Atlantic Dairy Compact Appalachian Virginia
Southeast Dairy Compact Southeast, Florida, and the
northern portion of Missouri
that will be in the proposed
Central order.
Table 3.  Economic Impact of the Combined Dairy Compact Scenarios





Change % Chng Change % Chng Change % Chng Change % Chng Change Change
mil. lbs. percent mil. lbs. percent mil. lbs. Percent mil. lbs. Percent $/cwt $/cwt
Compact Orders:
  Northeast 342.32 1.4% -187.41 -1.8% 378.77 5.1% 141.2 5.7% $1.77 $0.54
  Appalachian 128.85 2.6% -74.03 -1.8% 201.41 62.6% NA NA $1.77 $1.13
  Florida 63.86 2.2% -39.46 -1.6% 102.72 49.3% NA NA $1.77 $1.11
  Southeast 168.20 2.2% -84.30 -1.6% 250.66 17.8% NA NA $1.77 $0.97
Non-Compact
Orders:
  Mideast -63.03 -0.5% 15.99 0.2% -78.04 -2.4% -6.8 -1.4% -$0.23 -$0.19
  Upper Midwest -128.53 -0.6% 10.39 0.2% -163.74 -1.0% 21.7 13.8% -$0.23 -$0.21
  Central -42.99 -0.4% 5.18 0.1% -51.82 -1.3% 1.2 0.3% -$0.11 -$0.17
  Southwest -41.28 -0.5% 8.91 0.2% -46.06 -1.8% -7.0 -1.1% -$0.23 -$0.19
  Western -29.77 -0.6% 2.64 0.2% -33.16 -1.0% NA NA -$0.23 -$0.21
  Arizona-Las Vegas -17.20 -0.6% 2.38 0.2% -20.01 -1.2% NA NA -$0.23 -$0.21
  Pacific Northwest -29.57 -0.5% 5.00 0.2% -11.11 -1.1% -24.8 -0.9% -$0.23 -$0.16
  Other Unregulated -41.62 -0.2% -20.87 -0.3% -25.74 -0.2% NA NA $0.34 -$0.07
  California -157.38 -0.5% 12.22 0.2% NA NA NA NA -$0.21 -$0.1711
Table 4. Select Economic Tradeoffs for Farmers, Processor/Retailers,
and Consumers due to a Combined Dairy Compact
Combined Dairy
Compact Scenario
Baseline Change % Change
NORTHEAST
  Farm milk sales (mil $) 3,373.4 182.7 5.4%
  Fluid processor/retail margin (mil $) 1,628.6 -28.7 -1.8%
  Retail fluid milk expenditures (mil $) 3,302.0 127.1 3.9%
APPALACHIA
  Farm milk sales (mil $) 746.2 77.0 10.3%
  Fluid processor/retail margin (mil $) 570.1 -10.5 -1.8%
  Retail fluid milk expenditures (mil $) 1,199.1 48.2 4.0%
SOUTHEAST
  Farm milk sales (mil $) 1,126.8 99.9 8.9%
  Fluid processor/retail margin (mil $) 998.1 -15.8 -1.6%
  Retail fluid milk expenditures (mil $) 1,858.3 63.9 3.4%
FLORIDA
  Farm milk sales (mil $) 526.8 45.1 8.6%
  Fluid processor/retail margin (mil $) 399.6 -6.3 -1.6%
  Retail fluid milk expenditures (mil $) 869.9 29.9 3.4%
MIDEAST
  Farm milk sales (mil $) 1,777.1 -32.8 -1.8%
  Fluid processor/retail margin (mil $) 1,083.2 2.5 0.2%
  Retail fluid milk expenditures (mil $) 2,109.3 -10.5 -0.5%
UPPER MIDWEST
  Farm milk sales (mil $) 2,768.9 -62.3 -2.3%
  Fluid processor/retail margin (mil $) 681.9 1.6 0.2%
  Retail fluid milk expenditures (mil $) 1,371.0 -6.8 -0.5%
CENTRAL
  Farm milk sales (mil $) 1,307.0 -22.1 -1.7%
  Fluid processor/retail margin (mil $) 705.6 0.8 0.1%
  Retail fluid milk expenditures (mil $) 1,380.1 -3.4 -0.2%
SOUTHWEST
  Farm milk sales (mil $) 1,134.4 -21.3 -1.9%
  Fluid processor/retail margin (mil $) 694.9 1.5 0.2%
  Retail fluid milk expenditures (mil $) 1,301.7 -6.1 -0.5%
WESTERN
  Farm milk sales (mil $) 603.4 -14.1 -2.3%
  Fluid processor/retail margin (mil $) 197.0 0.5 0.2%
  Retail fluid milk expenditures (mil $) 352.8 -1.7 -0.5%
ARIZONA-LOS VEGAS
  Farm milk sales (mil $) 376.4 -8.4 -2.2%
  Fluid processor/retail margin (mil $) 180.2 0.4 0.2%
  Retail fluid milk expenditures (mil $) 328.0 -1.6 -0.5%
PACIFIC NORTHWEST12
  Farm milk sales (mil $) 820.1 -14.2 -1.7%
  Fluid processor/retail margin (mil $) 377.3 0.9 0.2%
  Retail fluid milk expenditures (mil $) 684.5 -3.3 -0.5%
OTHER UNREGULATED REGIONS
  Farm milk sales (mil $) 2,818.5 -20.6 -0.7%
  Fluid processor/retail margin (mil $) 1,101.6 -3.6 -0.3%
  Retail fluid milk expenditures (mil $) 2,055.7 14.5 0.7%
CALIFORNIA
  Farm milk sales (mil $) 3,297.6 -66.9 -2.0%
  Fluid processor/retail margin (mil $) 1,489.9 2.8 0.2%
  Retail fluid milk expenditures (mil $) 2,294.3 -9.2 -0.4%
TOTAL U.S.
  Farm milk sales (mil $) 20,676.6 141.8 0.7%
  Fluid processor/retail margin (mil $) 10,108.0 -53.8 -0.5%
  Retail fluid milk expenditures (mil $) 19,106.9 240.8 1.3%